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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
GERALD W. DEITMAN and 
ALBERT D. LOZANO, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20584 
Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by the 
Court on May 28, 1987. Originally this case was appealed from 
convictions imposed for Burglary, a third degree felony, and Theft, 
a second degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at pp. 
2-4. 
INTRODUCTION 
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In Brown v. Pickard, denying 
rehfg, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the 
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court failed 
to consider some material point in the case, or 
that it erred in its conclusions.... 
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11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson# 129 P. 619 (1913) this 
Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to { 
discourage the practice of filing petitions for 
rehearings in proper cases. When this court, 
however, has considered and decided all of the 
material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong principle 
of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result.... 
If there are some reasons, however, such as we -
have indicated above, or other good reasons, a 
petition for a rehearing should be promptly filed 
and, if it is meritorious, its form will in no 
case be scrutinized by this court. 
Cummings v. Nielson, supra at 624. The argument section of this * 
brief will establish that, applying these standards, this petition 
for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted. 
Indeed, in its opinion of State v. Deitman, 58 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 | 
(1987), P.2d , (filed May 28, 1987)(attached as Addendum A), 
this Court has misconstrued and misapprehended the facts and law. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT j 
The initial encounter between police and Appellants was a 
seizure requiring a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 
afoot in order to be justified. Neither the United States Supreme 4 
Court nor this Court has established prior to this opinion that 
police may initiate contact with an individual on a public street 
absent a showing that they had such a reasonable suspicion. In 4 
addition, the facts in the present case establish that even if such 
a police-citizen encounter were permissible, absent a reasonable 
suspicion, the officer actually stopped or seized Appellants where 4 
- 2 -
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he followed Appellants and attempted to effectuate a stop, then 
called to Appellants and asked to talk with them, Appellants 
responded by crossing the street to where the officer stood, the 
officer asked for identification and then detained Appellants while 
running a warrants check and asked several investigatory questions. 
As contended in Appellant's opening brief, the officer lacked a 
reasonable suspicion to justify such seizure, and the fruits thereof 
should be suppressed, 
ARGUMENT 
THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN APPELLANTS AND POLICE 
WAS A SEIZURE REQUIRING A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WAS AFOOT TO BE JUSTIFIED. 
This Court relied on United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 
(5th Cir. 1984), for the proposition, and ultimately the support for 
its holding, that the facts of the case demonstrated a 
constitutionally permissible police-citizen encounter. See Addendum 
A. The decision reads: 
In United States v. Merritt...the Fifth Circuit 
Court delineated three levels of police 
encounters with the public which the United 
States Supreme Court has held are 
constitutionally permissible: 
(l)an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3)an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
United States v. Merritt, supra, at 230 (citations omitted). This 
Court then states, "In this case, the initial encounter by the 
police with defendants falls into the first category." 
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However, in citing Merritt and relying on the above 
quotation, this Court misapprehends the law. In I.N.S. v. Delgado, 
466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984), the United States Supreme Court expressly 
stated that that Court has "yet to rule directly on whether mere 
questioning of an individual by a police officer, without more, can 
amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment..." The Supreme 
Court then added that the recent decision in Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491 (1983), implied that requests by police for one's 
identification would unlikely result in a Fourth Amendment 
violation. I.N.S. v. Delgado, supra, at 216. However, Florida v. 
Royer, supra, actually held that officers had illegally detained the 
defendant at the time of his consent to a search of his luggage 
thereby tainting the search and rendering ineffective the consent. 
Florida v. Royer, supra at 507-08. 
Moreover, Florida v. Royer is a case which fits into a very 
narrow factual context and is distinguishable on that basis. 
Florida v. Royer, supra; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 
(1980); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Reid v. 
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); and Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 
(1984); are all cases which draw support for the police-citizen 
encounter concept in the context of detaining "drug couriers" at 
airports. These cases are distinguishable from the present case 
because of the transitory nature of airports, the government's 
compelling interest in stopping the transportation of drugs, and the 
use of drug courier profiles in making a decision to approach an 
individual. The United States Supreme Court has therefore given 
special consideration and allowances in balancing these special 
- 4 -
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concerns and interests with those of the Fourth Amendment, See 
generally United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 561 (Powell, J., 
concurring opinion); and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 508 (Powell, 
J., concurring opinion)(facts and circumstances of investigative 
stops necessarily vary, and the public has compelling interest in 
identifying by all lawful means those who traffic in illicit drugs). 
The rationale for the Royer and Mendenhall line of cases 
was borrowed from cases involving the violation of immigration 
laws. This is another area where the exigencies of the 
circumstances and a compelling governmental interest warrant a 
limiting of Fourth Amendment protections. 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), 
the United States Supreme Court clarified that reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity could warrant a temporary seizure for the 
purpose of questioning, limited, however, to verifying or dispelling 
the suspicion that the immigration laws were being violated. The 
Court recognized such violation as "a governmental interest that was 
sufficient to warrant temporary detention for limited questioning.ff 
Royer, supra, at 498-99 (citing Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 881-82). 
Notably, immigration violations, like drug courier cases, fit within 
the realm of profiles, target cities, and other exigencies demanding 
a stretch of the balancing of the interests of society and the 
individual's Fourth Amendment rights.1 
^One additional exception where a temporary detention is 
satisfied as reasonably based on the exigencies involved is that of 
detaining the occupant of a house while executing a search warrant. 
See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (L981). 
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Unlike those special, more demanding types of cases, the 
case at bar contains no special exigencies to demand the same 
narrowing of the individual's rights against unreasonable search and 
seizures. Inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court has never 
directly ruled on the constitutionality of police-citizen encounters 
as explained in Delgado, and has not implicitly approved such a 
concept in the context of this case—where police approach a citizen 
on a public street, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Merritt is in 
error to imply that they have, 
i 
A review of the facts in Merritt discloses that the cited 
language there is dictum. In Merritt, the government did not argue 
that a police-citizen encounter, rather than a seizure, occurred. 
The government consistently and successfully argued that the 
investigatory stop was supported by an articuable suspicion that the 
vessel was engaged in drug trafficking. The Fifth Circuit actually 
i 
affirmed that the stop was valid under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968) standards. United States v. Merritt, supra, at 230. The 
cited language was surplusage in Merritt and should not be relied on 
by this Court in establishing new law in this jurisdiction. 
This Court has yet to approve and legitimize the 
police-citizen encounter theory. Statutorily, there appears to be 
i 
no room for such a theory. Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as 
amended) provides: 
§77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may < 
stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
- 6 -
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This statutory codification of Terry v. Ohio, supra, requires an 
officer to have a reasonable suspicion to stop an individual and ask 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
Additionally, case law from this Court has yet to establish 
that police may approach an individual or otherwise initiate an 
interaction with an individual absent a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity. In 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), cited in the 
opinion, an officer approached defendants in an all-night laundromat 
at 1:00 a.m. The officer asked the individuals for identification 
and an explanation of their presence. This Court held that "there 
was no improper seizure or detention in the questioning." ld_. at 
105 (emphasis added). There was "no improper seizure" because the 
officer articulated reasonable, objective facts upon which he based 
the stop. Those facts were: (1) the officer knew there had been 
several thefts committed in the area; (2) he observed that the 
defendants were alone in the laundromat; and (3) from previous 
encounters with them, he knew they were from out-of-town and that, 
on the prior occasion, they had been in possession of contraband and 
a bag full of coins. Ij3. This Court, therefore, considered the 
stop a seizure and not a police-citizen encounter. 
In State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984), 
this Court found that no seizure, detention or investigatory stop 
occurred and pointed out that "[a]ny person may, of course, direct a 
question to another in passing" (citations omitted), in 
Christensen, police officers were investigating an abandoned truck 
and attached trailer which was obstructing traffic. The defendant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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returned to the scene, got out of the vehicle in which he was < 
riding, and approached the officers. The appellant, not the 
officers, initiated contact. In determining whether a seizure 
occurred, there is a marked distinction between an individual { 
approaching the officers, and the officers initiating the encounter 
by following an individual, then asking the individual to answer 
some questions. 
In the present case, officers followed Appellants and 
initiated the contact with Appellants. Although Appellants walked 
across the street to the officerfs car, they did so in response to a 
request by the officer. In its brief, the state concedes that the 
officers initially approached Appellants and posed questions as 
part of their investigation of the alarm (Respondent's Brief at 8). 
Although the initial stop of Appellants in this case did not amount 
to an arrest requiring probable cause, it nevertheless was a 
temporary detention for investigatory purposes and pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended), the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, the officers needed a reasonable articulable suspicion 
that Appellants had committed a crime to justify the stop and 
subsequent request for identification. 
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), an officer 
stopped two men walking near the scene of a burglary. The officer 
told the men to stop and asked for identification. A backup officer 
arrived and the officers phoned in a warrants check. This Court 
considered this action a "seizure" and held that the officers did 
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not have a reasonable suspicion based on objective facts to justify 
the stop.2 
Even if this Court accepts the concept that police may 
initiate contact with individuals on a public street absent a 
reasonable suspicion that they are involved in criminal activity, 
the facts in this case indicate nevertheless that the initial 
encounter between the officer and the appellants was a seizure. The 
initial stop in this case is similar to the actual stop in 
Swanigan. The only difference is one of semantics-in Swanigan the 
officer approached the individuals and asked them for 
identification, then ran a warrants check. In the present case, the 
officer asked to talk to the appellants; they responded to his 
request by crossing the street to where he was standing. The 
officer then asked for identification and ran a warrants check on 
the pair. The officer's decision to arrest Swanigan based on an 
outstanding warrant as opposed to the officer's decision not to 
arrest based on the warrant he found in this case, does not change 
the nature of the initial detention. 
In the present case, the officer spotted Deitman and Lozano 
near the place where the alarm sounded. He followed their vehicle 
for approximately two blocks, then attempted to effectuate a stop 
(T. 40-41). At the time the officer attempted to stop the pair, 
they were pulling into a driveway, so the officer pulled across the 
street and waited (T. 41). When the pair got out of their vehicle, 
the officer called to them and asked to talk with them. They 
2Noteworthy in Swanigan is that the State confessed error 
and admitted that the evidence was seized pursuant to an unlawful 
detention. Swanigan, 699 P.2d at 719. 
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responded to his request by walking to where he was standing (T. 
42). The pair gave the officer the identification he requested; the 
officer then ran a warrants check on them which lasted two to three 
minutes (T. 42). The officer then asked the pair what they had been 
doing in the area of the video store where the alarm went off (T. 
42-43). 
Even if this court chooses to draw a distinction in 
deciding whether a seizure occurred based on whether the officer 
approached individuals and asked for identification or called to 
them and had them approach him in response to his request, detaining 
individuals to run a warrants check after the initial questioning 
nevertheless amounts to a seizure. For this Court to hold in this 
case that a detention to run a warrants check on an individual is 
not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution, and is permissible police activity which does 
not require a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity, opens the door for significant abuse by police officers. 
Pursuant to the opinion in this case, officers arguably could 
initiate an encounter with individuals on no grounds whatsoever, 
couch their initial statements to those individuals in terms.of a 
request rather than demand, request that the individual walk to them 
rather than walking over to the individual, then run a warrants 
check on such individuals and proceed with investigatory questioning 
where the individuals have done nothing irregular. Surely, where an 
officer attempts to effectuate a stop, acknowledges that he followed 
and requested to talk to individuals as part of an investigation, 
asks those individuals to identify themselves and runs a warrants 
- 10 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
check on such individuals, then asks investigatory questions/ a 
"seizure" has occurred and the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution come into play. 
If this Court distinguishes this case from Swanigan and 
decides against Messrs. Deitman and Lozano, it should resist any 
temptation to do so on the police-citizen encounter theory. Not 
only is Merritt bad precedent for establishing the concept that 
officers may initiate encounters with citizens on less than a 
reasonable suspicion, but in this case the initial interaction 
amounted to a seizure. In its brief, while the State does make a 
one sentence statement that the initial encounter in this case was 
not a seizure, the State primarily argues that the officers had a 
reasonable suspicion to stop the Appellants (Brief of Respondent, 
pp. 7-8). 
In this petition for rehearing, Messrs. Deitman and Lozano 
request that this Court reconsider the police-citizen encounter 
concept in general and as applied to the facts of this case and 
refrain from a further narrowing of the individual rights protected 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this Court has misconstrued and misapplied the 
facts and law in this case, the Appellants respectfully petition 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this Court to reconsider its decision in this case and reverse and 
remand the convictions for either a new trial or dismissal of the 
charges* 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of*/- day /of June, 1987. 
hix^-oJii&JtJ? 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATION 
I, BROOKE C. WELLS, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for appellants/petitioners in this 
case and; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ V ^ day /of June, 1987. 
!
^fu &- 6ui ^hi^ 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Appellants 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing Petition for 
Rehearing to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this day of June, 1987. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Gerald W. Deitman and 
Albert D. Lczano, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 20584 
F I L E D 
May 2 8 , 1987 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys: David C. Biggs, Brooke C. Wells, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
• Dave Thompson, Earl F. Dorius, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondents 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendants appeal from convictions of burglary1 and 
theft.2 They raise as their single issue that the evidence 
should have been suppressed on the ground that police officers 
had insufficient probable cause to effectuate a stop. We 
affirm. 
In the early morning hours of March 1, 1984, a 
burglar alarm sounded at International Video in Salt Lake 
City. Officers arriving at the scene observed a white pickup 
truck, with a camper attached, pull away from the curb across 
the street from the shop. One of the officers followed this 
truck until it stopped in front of a residence a few blocks 
away. The officer waited until the occupants, defendants, 
exited the vehicle. The officer called to defendants and 
asked if he could speak to them. They responded by crossing 
the street to his vehicle and presented identification upon 
request. The officer then asked his dispatcher to check for 
outstanding warrants against defendants, which revealed an 
outstanding warrant against Mr. Lozano. However, neither 
defendant was arrested at this time. 
IT. A third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1953). 
2. A second degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 
(1953). 
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The officer then returned to the video shop, where 
other officers had found a broken window and had called the 
owner of the shop. The owner reported that a two-piece video 
cassette recorder was missing* 
Officers returned to the residence where the white 
truck was still parked and knocked on the door. Defendants 
agreed to talk to the officers. Defendant Deitman gave the 
officers permission to look into the truck but not to enter 
it. One officer flashed his light into the rear window of 
the camper and observed "a black rectangular object with what 
appeared to be a memory switch." Defendants were arrested and 
the truck was impounded. A search warrant was obtained. The 
truck was searched, and a VCR and a tuner were discovered in 
the truck. The VCR had the serial No. 2025H0058. The serial 
number reported by the owner to be on the missing VCR was 
No. 202510058. This number was therefore listed on the 
search warrant. 
Defendants contend that the officers had no probable 
cause for the initial stop and that the trial court erred in 
denying their pretrial motion, renewed at trial, to suppress 
the evidence. 
In United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 
1984), the Fifth Circuit Court delineated three levels of 
police encounters with the public which the United States 
Supreme Court has held are constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime? however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect 
if the officer has probable cause to believe 
an offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
736 F.2d at 230 (citation omitted) . . 
In this case, the initial encounter by the police with 
defendants falls into the first category. The officer was 
justified in asking defendants for identification and an 
explanation of their presence in an area where police had 
responded to a burglar alarm. Defendants were not detained 
against their will and were not arrested at this time. In 
State v. Wittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), this Court said: 
No-. 20584 • 2 
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Though there may be no probable cause to 
make an arrest, a police officer may, in 
appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner, approach a person for 
investigating possible criminal behavior. 
621 P.2d at 105. 
Defendants rely on State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 
(Utah 1985), and State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), 
but neither case is applicable here. In both Carpena and 
Swanigan, the defendants were stopped, detained, and searched 
without their consent. Here, defendants were not stopped by 
the officer and raised no objection when the officer asked if 
he could talk to them. They crossed the street, produced 
identification on request, and were not detained against 
their will. We hold that the court did not err in refusing 
to suppress the evidence under these circumstances. 
Defendants also argue that the search warrant was 
defective because the serial number of the VCR contained an 
incorrect number in place of a letter. However, since defen-
dants admit that this error in the warrant did not render the 
property#seized "inherently unidentifiable as being stolen," 
State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985), we do not discuss 
the issue. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, Justice, concurs in the result. 
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